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The International Law and Deplomacy of the Russo-JTapanese War.
By Amos A. Hershey. New York. The MacMillan Co., x9o6.
Pages 394. $3.
The Russo-Japanese war had a unique interest to students of
international law. It was the first and still remains the only
war since the Hague Conference of 1899, in which both parties
were adherents to the conventions framed by that Conference.
It was therefore fair to expect that it would be conducted
with more regard both to humanity and to the principles of inter-
national justice, than has been apt to characterize such conflicts
between nations in former days. Professor Hershey, who holds
the chair of Political Science and International Law in Indiana
University, has done a real service in recounting the general
course of this war so far as it may illustrate the development of
those branches of jurisprudence, and giving us the benefit of his
own conclusions. These are expressed with moderation, and, if
favorable on the whole to the Japanese contentions, are hardly
more so than the judgment of at least Anglo-American public
opinion.
Did Japan transgress any recognized rule of international
obligation when she struck at Port Arthur before any formal
declaration of war? Professor Hershey is of opinion (pp.- 6o, 61,
66) that the notice which she gave Russia on February 6 of her
reserved right to take such action as it might deem best to pro-
tect her own interests was under the circumstances enough to
justify her naval attacks on February 8. The telegraph in our
times is a swift and certain messenger, and if Russia had not
anticipated war as a probable result of its refusal of Japan's over-
tures toward a settlement, it was her own fault.
Professor Hershey considers the protest of Russia against
Japan's forcing Korea to admit her troops, at the outset of the
war, as theoretically sound but practically absurd (p. 72). Neu-
tral territory, for the control of which a war is being fought, can
hardly expect to be left in peace by either belligerent. Nor can
it be forgotten that Korea had been for a considerable part of its
more recent history practically under Japanese control, and was
but fifty miles away from the island empire.
The author does not think our government failed in the duty
of neutrality by doing nothing to check popular but private sub-
scriptions in aid of the Japanese (pp. 84, 87). Here again the
question is one of practice. Too much weight, he thinks, has
been accorded to some observations which have fallen from the
courts on this subject. The tendency of law students and per-
haps of publicists is to search for particular judicial precedents,
rather than for the general practice of nations, and that it
encourages this tendency he deems "one of the gravest objec-
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tions to the teaching of International Law mainly or exclusively
by the use of the 'case system"' (p. 85).
The Russian assertion of a right to treat newspaper corres-
pondents, making use of wireless telegraphy on the high seas, as
spies, the author considers not only as contravening the Hague
Convention of 2899 as to the rules of Land Warfare, but as
wholly against sound reason (pp. 118, 12). The opinion of the
Institute of International Law (p. Y35) expressed at Ghent in
September, 19o6, is to the same effect. In respect to the general
instructions to their commanders by both governments regard-
ing the conduct of military operations, Professor Hershey justly
emphasizes (p. 294) the fact that they are the expression of an
advancing civilization, which is gradually stripping war of many
of its horrors.
As to the vexed question of limiting the supply of coal fur-
nished to belligerent men of war visiting a neutral port, he
ranges himself with those who would confine it to no more than
will take them to the nearest convenient port, at which they can
safely call (pp. 89, 214).
The style of the treatise is clear, the arrangement simple and
the index full. S. E. B.
The First Year of Roman Law. By Fernand Bernard. Translated
by Charles P. Sherman, D. C. L., Oxford University Press.
The title of this volume reveals its true purpose. It is not
intended to be a comprehensive work on Roman Law, but a first
year book, setting forth many of the essential facts of the sub-
ject in a brief and interesting way, to be followed by the study
of a second year book by the same author, not yet accessible in
English translation. As Professor Bernard states in his preface,
this book, in spite of its restricted dimensions, is not intended to
be one of those lifeless skeletons of the subject so much employed
abroad as brief digests for the cram of preliminary examinations
in Roman law. It is a book by which one may well begin his
acquaintance with the subject and, notwithstanding its modest
size, the volume is peculiarly satisfactory in its content, in that
it embodies modern doctrine and the results of recent scholarly
research. It should be said that the author has followed very
closely the teaching of the law faculty of Paris and that he has
therefore laid under contribution only five contemporaneous
writers, Cuq, Girard, Esmein, G6rardin, Jobb6-Duval. In cling-
ing too exclusively to French authorities, however, there is
always the danger of yielding too much to their brilliant specu-
lations regarding those institutions which are to a greater or
less extent being affected in the present day by the discovery of
new sources. For the interpretation of the legal papyri, which
have already shed much new light on many phases of legal his-
tory and the details of legal transactions, there is need of vast
philological and legal knowledge, as well as most conservative
judgment. In this field one cannot safely disregard the import-
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ant and brilliant work of such investigators as Mitteis and
Gradenwitz.
Our author has divided the subject matter of his work into
seven books, each with its appropriate subdivisions and titles.
Following the usual pedagogical method of the Civilians, the
first book is devoted to the external history of the Roman law
and to an outline of Roman constitutional history. The tra-
ditional division into periods is followed. In a compendious
treatment of the law of Rome, it is most difficult to determine
upon a method which will embrace the changes in the law
wrought by important developments in legal history and yet to
give a consecutive and logical exposition of legal institutions.
We think the author does well to begin with an outline of the
Roman constitution and with an insight, though necessarily
brief, into the legislative functions of the Roman government,
but it does not seem to be worth the space required, to discuss
the ethnic divisions of the early inhabitants of Rome. The
atest historical research has amply shown the apochryphal char-
acter of much of the legendary history of Rome, and any space
occupied by discussion of the three tribes, Ramnenses, Titienses
and Luceres, a purely arbitrary division, having no legal signifi-
cance whatever, might be reserved for more important matters.
Granting that the whole question of the origin of clients and
plebeians is still unsettled, we are somewhat startled to find it
put dogmatically that the plebs did not appear until the second
century of Rome (§r6), a statement difficult of proof, whose
value is somewhat impaired by a later remark that the origin of
the plebs is quite problematical. In the discussion of the func-
tion of the praetor in the development of law such a statement
as "the legislative activity of the praetor" (§49) might easily
mislead the beginner. As Prof. James Bryce has well shown
(Studies in Jurisprudence and History), the praetor did not "leg-
islate," but assisted in the development of principles through his
control of procedure. This prerogative of the praetor, growing
out of his ius edicendi, was shared by him with all the higher
magistrates of Rome. That "all these magistrates have the ius
honorum" (§5o) in explanation of the term ius honorarium is con-
fusing. The ius honorum is the right of eligibility to office,
without which one could not clothe a magistracy. From this
honor (office), the system of legal principles which, by interpre-
tation, grew up around the praetorian edict especially, was
called ius honorarium.
In describing the duties of the jurisconsults it is somewhat
questionable interpretation to ascribe to them the duty "to act
in court for their clients" (agere). This has a modern sound,
whereas the legal profession of Rome was so unlike that known
to us, in more than one particular, that it requires careful ex-
planation From the earliest times, "acting in court" in behalf
of clients was performed by the patronus, as a duty, and in later
times by professional advocates, who were not regarded as
belonging to the profession of jurists. In fact, they were gener-
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ally ignorant of questions of law. This is the point of the
rebuke given the orator, Servius Sulpicius, by the jurist Mucius
Scaevola, when consulted on a point of law, 'turpe essepatricio et
nobili et causas oranti ius in quo versaretur igorarr' (Pompon.
Dig. 1, 2, 43).
The remaining six books of the volume are devoted respec-
tively to Persons, Things, Actions, Ownership, Successions,
Donations inter vivos and Mortis Causa. Inasmuch as the trans-
lated work is intended to be of service to the American student
in guiding him in his first acquaintance with Roman law, it is to
be regretted that there is no book devoted to Obligations. This
omission is explained by the fact that this important subject is
reserved by the French law faculty for the instruction of the
second year. To us, however, no part of the Roman system is
so illuminating and valuable as the refined and lucid treatment
of the obligations growing out of contract, as discussed by the
great jurists in the Digest.
It is in the clear, succinct and yet withal, interesting style
that a large part of the volume's excellence lies. There is com-
paratively little in the subject matter to awaken adverse criti-
cism. Some statements tend to raise a query, perhaps, because
of their brevity. For example, the statement of the principle
by which ownership is determined in cases of speciflcatio, confusio
and commixtio is not entirely adequate. The rule "accessio cedat
principali" scarcely assists in cases of confusio, as, for example,
the mixing of two kinds of wine of equal quality. Which is the
res principalis. In specificatio the general rule is that he who
does the work which transforms the property of another into a
new object usually acquires the right of ownership to the new
product, while in case of the union of things inseparable, as wine
and wine, joint ownership of the whole mass is commonly pro-
duced. On the other hand, in commixtio of things separable, no
change of ownership occurs. The author's statement of these
difficult principles is scarcely distinct enough for an elementary
treatise.
Passing on to the translator's share in the work, the intro-
ductory note informs the reader, in a somewhat labored sentence,
that "the object of this labor of love is to place in the hands of
students, and of others who desire an acquaintance, readily
obtained, with the Roman law, an English version of a French
work, designed for use in the law schools of France, which is
remarkable for several excellencies that adapt it to become per-
haps the best elementary treatise for commencing the study of
Roman law." In view of this statement, we are justified in ex-
pecting the translator's work to present a high degree of excel-
lence, preserving the lucidity and something of the charm of
style of the original. To translate or publish any work on
Roman law for English readers is certainly a labor of love, and
for that reason may merit most courteous treatment. The dif-
ficulty of rendering into the English language the technical ex-
pressions of a legal system so different from our own is so great
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as to convince some authors that the Latin terms must be re-
tained without attempted translation. In this matter, Dr. Sher-
man has shown discretion and has not allowed himself to be
tempted too far by the example of the original French, since a
French- writer on Roman law finds it easy and natural to adopt
the Roman terminology by reason of the Latin characteristics
of his own language and the Roman origin of the bulk of his
legal system. In attempting to preserve the terse and almost
telegraphic style of the French original, the translator has in
many places strained the idioms of our tongue beyond the point
of endurance, retaining French order and vocabulary to such an
extent as to obscure the meaning, without recourse to the origi-
nal French. Except for a temporary loss of Sprachgefiihl for
his native English while working under the spell of Dr. Bernard's
brilliant diction, such expressions as the following could scarcely
be accounted for in any English work: "the name so familiar of
Quirites is applied therefore to the patricii alone" (le nom si
connu de quirites s'applique, §5); "according to the historians, at
this time commissioners charged with studying Hellenic laws
should have been sent into Greece" (on aurait envoyS, §35),
meaning that according to the traditional account commissioners
were sent, etc.; "so the senate, before the time of Tiberius,
should legislate but rarely" (aussi n'a-t-il da legifirer que bien
rarement, §43), meaning that the senate did legislate but rarely,
since the statement has just preceded, that the senate did not
have the right to make law; "the discovery of some pure sources
has permitted the recovery of many of them" (la dicouverte de
quelques sources pures a permis d'en relever beaucoup, §97), mean-
ing that the discovery of original sources has made possible the
correction of many erroneous interpolations in the Digest; "free
marriage did not cease becoming general" (le marriage libre ne
cessa de se ginlraliser, §248), meaning that free marriage became
more and more usual; "arrogatio presented a special import-
ance" (prisentait unegravitlparticulire, §300), meaning arroga-
tion was especially important; "res mancipi would have con-
stituted" (auraient constitu, p. 135, n), meaning that 'es ancipi
constituted the familia; "but a false idea, and above all scarcely
Roman, would be given of obligations" (seulement on seferait une
ide fausse et surtout peu romaine, des obligations, §442); "it
(traditio) will not transfer ownership only as often as the tradens
shall have had the intention to transfer ownership" (elle ne sera
translative depropritd qu'autant que, §636), where the not should
certainly be deleted and only as often as should then read only
wizen the tradens, etc. Passing on to the testamentary substitu-
tion of heirs, this gallicized English statement would certainly
puzzle a reader without recourse to the original text: "resulting
from the unlimited importance which the Romans attached to
not dying intestate, they became ingenious to avoid by every
means that their succession, by predecease, repudiation, inca-
pacity of the heir, should become vacant" (Itant donnie l'impor-
tance sans bornes que les Romains attachaient a nepas mourir intes-
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tats, ils devaient s'ing/nier a Iviter par tous les moyens que leur
kiriditi. . ne demeurdt vacante, §756). The value and purpose
of an elementary text book are certainly impaired, if not
altogether destroyed, by inaccurate statement or by a lack of
clearness and directness of expression, and our purpose in citing
several of the foregoing passages is to show the need of revision
in a second edition of this volume. There are several slips of
-different kinds in the original, and although the translator has
corrected some of them, he has retained a number of errors in
his translation, e. g., there is constant wavering, in the transla-
tion and in the original, in the name of Augustus' act directed
against "race-suicide," the famous lex Papia Poppaea. Likewise
in both books occur perduellio damnatus (perduellionis), collo 'e,
spondes ne, tigni immitendi, proemia (praemia). Such words as
conditionibus and tralatitiumn are no longer found in critical
Latin texts. If the author yields to the demands of simplified
spelling in such words as edile, one may ask, why not pretorship
in the same paragraph (45)? Or with Paulus Emilianus, why not
Julius Cesar? All agree nowadays that the latter's praenomen
should be written Gaius, not Caius (§214). The English reader
unacquainted with French will be puzzled with the name, Bobce,
commentator on Cicero's Topica (p. 46, n. Y) and Denys of Halic.
(p. 84, n).
It is to be regretted that so many misprints, especially in
foreign words, escaped the proof-reader's eye: ius civili
(p. 42, n. i), .allius, Catiline's confederate (§221), lege egere
(§371), Heraclium (p. 128, n. i), dii superii, res sanctea (§425),
Poetelea (§436), porcedure (§464) nihi (§449), 254 B.C. (§234, P. i55,
n. 4), vocatio in hire (§499), die Civilprocess (p. 6ir, n. x), hunc
ago (§604), des r~misches (p. 207, n. 3), Czilarz (Czyhlarz),
aquaeh/austus kauriendae (§684, 2), argum (§723), caduciariae
6755), lex Voconia, 269 B. c. (§69).
With the removal of these errata and some of the blemishes
in the matter of translation, this book may safely and with
profit be put into the hands of beginners with a confidence that
the presentation of a subject, vast and intricate, may be found
attractive and intelligible in this manual.
Every aspirant to the study of Roman law may well start
with the firm conviction that to pursue this subject first hand,
he- must have a sound knowledge of the Latin language and con-
siderable acquaintance with Roman history and institutions.
Without this equipment he may derive some knowledge of the
elementary principles of Roman law from English manuals, such
as the one under consideration, but in making use of such ac-
quirement for comparison with the English system or the under-
standing of the law of our colonial dependencies, he must always
remain on slippery ground unless he has recourse to original
Roman sources. James J. Robinson.
REVIEWS
Law of Nuisances. Joseph A. and Howard C. Joyce. Matthew
Bender & Co., Albany, N. Y. Law Canvass, pp. 972.
The authors of this work have furnished to the profession a
decidedly up-to-date exposition of the law of England and this
country on this subject. Beginning with a compresensive list
of definitions of the word "nuisance" the end is devoted to a chap-
ter subdivided into Remedies, Parties, Defenses and Damages.
About 3,500 cases are cited and a noticeable feature of the work
is the care used in not only stating propositions concisely, but
also in citing cases directly in point as authority for the principle
laid down. There can be nothing more aggravating to the busy
lawyer than to jot down a lot of citations only to find a large
percentage of them inapplicable. A very complete and well
arranged index shows the endeavor to make it possible to turn to
any topic of the work at once. Such important questions as
smoke nuisances, water rights, sewage cases and municipal pow-
ers and liabilities are dwelt on at length and, in some instances,
as in the Chicago drainage canal case, much of the decisive par
of the court's opinion is stated. That so much meaty matter has
been condensed in a comparatively small book is the best proof
of the large amount of well applied and successful work which
the compilation of this volume must have involved. F. P. M.
The American Lawyer. By John R. Dos Passos of the New
York Bar. Banks Law Publishing Co. About 19o pages,
Buckram. $1.75.
When a man of the recognized standing and ability of John
R. Dos Passos gives his views on the American lawyer "As he
was, as he is, and as he can be," one is assured of a forceful state-
ment of original ideas. Already the author of a number of valu-
able works on the law, his latest contribution is very timely and
ought to be welcomed and read by all whether lawyer, student
of the law or those members of the general public who appreciate
first-hand information on a subject as to which there is much
misconception. In the opening chapters some rather startling
comparisons are made between the lawyer of to-day and his pre-
decessors of ante-bellum days. The average modern lawyer's
unfamiliarity with basic constitutional principles and his conse-
quent inefficiency as a legislator are dwelt on at length and to
this the author ascribes the major part of the unconstitutional
legislation which encumbers our statute books. In New York
State alone 1o9 such cases are cited-and these only by way of
illustration.
Under "Duties" of a lawyer the ethical side of the profession
is touched on and Lord Brougham's reverberating statement in
the Queen Caroline trial is referred to as "wholly, unmitigatedly
and disastrously bad." Under "Causes and Remedies," eleven
suggestions are made for the improvement of the profession.
Most of these would undoubtedly express the wishes of the aver-
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age member of the Bar while others will be received, perhaps,
rather coolly as, for instance, his xoth suggestion that the English
idea of a division into two classes, Attorneys or Solicitors and
Counselors and Barristers be adopted in the United States. That
this system has many undesirable and perhaps evil features will
be readily admitted. Code procedure and Codification in general
are now and have been more less deprecated by leading members
of the Bar, but it remained for this author to assert that (p. 170)
"the difference between a common law lawyer and the prac-
titioner under the code is the difference between a surgeon and a
butcher." It seems also a little broad to say (p. x x) that "in-
stead of seeking the truth, the Courts and the Bar are engaged
in the pursuit of technicality and form."
A careful reading of the book, which is made a pleasure by
the use of large, clear type and excellent paper, indicates an
earnest attempt by Mr. Dos Passos to ward off the acceptance
by lawyers of certain pernicious principles of conduct which the
changing conditions of society and business would almost seem
to warrant. F.P.M.
